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Abstract:
This article contributes to the understanding of the symbiotic relationship 
between the nonreligious and the religious in religiously homogenous 
cultures. Specifically, it examines the centrality of the religious 
congruence fallacy in the narratives of nonreligious people. Based on 60 
qualitative interviews with Polish nones, I chart the ways in which they 
make sense of the dominant model of Polish-Catholic religiosity, 
commonly referred to as the “Polak-Katolik”. The findings demonstrate 
that nonreligious Poles equate Polish Catholicism with hypocrisy, 
conformity, and an implicit fear of ostracism. In conclusion, I suggest 
that it is vital that scholars of nonreligion flesh out the complexities of 
the relationship between the nones and the religiously homogenous 







The Nonreligious and Catholicism in Poland.
Introduction
The process of ‘becoming religion’s other’ (Smith and Cragun, 2019: 8) inevitably involves a 
confrontation with one’s religious biography and an ongoing negotiation of relationships with 
religious people. The nonreligious often forge their personal narratives by drawing on past 
experiences with religion as part of their identity construction (Fazzino, 2014). For many the 
exit from religion is not clear-cut as they continue to live in predominantly religious contexts. 
While this may result in experiences of prejudice and discrimination (Edgell et al., 2006), it 
may also lead the formerly religious to develop an inside-outsider mentality. This mentality is 
partly derived from the ongoing interactions with religious people. The inside-outsider status 
is particularly evident in religiously homogenous cultures characterised by relatively high 
levels of religiosity. This article focuses on the case of the nonreligious in Poland to 
illustrate: 1) the interdependence of religion and non-religion, and 2) the importance of 
attending to ‘religious congruence’ in the sociological exploration of this inter-dependence.1   
One consequence of being shaped by a religiously homogenous culture is the Polish nones’ 
apparent concern with what Mark Chaves calls ‘religious congruence’ (2010). Chaves defines 
‘religious congruence’ as a threefold phenomenon. First, religious ideas are an internally 
consistent and self-contained system. Second, what religious people do is motivated directly 
by religious beliefs and values. Third, individuals carry these relatively fixed and readily 
accessible beliefs and values into a variety of situations. All three dimensions presume logic, 
order, and consistency of ideas and behaviour. In reality, Chaves posits, religious beliefs and 
practices are messy and context-dependent (2010: 4). Religious people are not hypocritical 

































































when their actions do not correspond with their beliefs. Rather, scholars who study religious 
people commit the error of the religious congruence fallacy when they impose a non-existent 
congruence on their research data. As I demonstrate below, the perceptions of Polish 
Catholics by the nonreligious rest on a similar fallacy. 
Based on the findings that follow, I argue that the ‘religious congruence fallacy’ (Chaves, 
2010) forms a vital part of the secular worldview among Polish nones.  I examine how 
nonreligious Poles perceive, and effectively denounce, the dominant model of Polish-
Catholic religiosity, commonly referred to as the ‘Polak-Katolik’. By critiquing the model, 
the nones forge their vision of ‘proper religiosity’ as they contrast the theoretical ideal with 
the reality on the ground. My participants provide an experience-based analysis of their own 
country with respect to its celebrated status as the bastion of Catholicism. The key questions 
posed in this article are: (a) how do self-proclaimed cultural deviants read the religious 
landscape in which they live, and (b) how do they interpret the long-honoured descriptors of 
Polish Catholicism. I suggest that, by virtue of their status as ‘internal Others’ (Zubrzycki, 
2006: 54) in a mono-confessional Catholic country (Borowik et al., 2014), the nonreligious in 
Poland function as ‘familiar strangers’ par excellence and articulate what normally remains 
unsaid. All deconversion narratives necessarily contain the story of the individual’s religious 
background which is in turn situated in a particular religious field. It is important to know 
how nonreligious Poles make sense of their field because these views and interpretations 
shape their lives as a nonreligious minority. Additionally, the study of nonreligious 
worldviews can help us better understand both religion and the commonly held assumptions 
about the congruence between religious identities, beliefs, and behaviour (Chaves, 2010). 

































































Another reason to ask how the nonreligious relate to the theistic culture of their homeland is 
that, with the exception of one sociological study of nones as a numerical and cultural 
minority in Poland (Tyrala, 2014; 2018), no qualitative research on the nonreligious as an 
umbrella category exists.2 In order to understand better the Polish religious landscape from 
the perspective of ‘inside-outsiders’, we must go beyond surveys and opinion polls. The view 
from the minority sheds light on several aspects relevant to the study of religion and non-
religion in countries characterized by religious homogeneity: cultural religion and its 
relationship with non-conformists; national identity and religion; and the role of conformity 
in maintaining cultural myths. 
Nones and religion
Over the past two decades scholars of nonreligion have addressed the relationship between 
religious and nonreligious people in a number of ways. Two prominent themes in the study of 
nonreligion from this angle have been prejudice and discrimination against nones (Cragun et 
al., 2012; Edgell et al., 2006; Gerteis and Hartman, 2006; Gervais, 2013; Hammer et al., 
2012; Harper, 2007), and the construction of nones’ autobiographical accounts of 
deconversion (Guenther, 2014; Fazzino, 2014; Zuckerman, 2012). In both cases, religion 
constitutes the chief backdrop to the process of crafting secular lives and identities while 
making sense of the social context in which the process occurs. The religious and the 
nonreligious exist in ‘symbiotic relationships’ (Marty in Cimino and Smith, 2014: xi) because 
they need each other to validate their respective stances. Thus religion occupies a significant 
amount of space in the personal narratives of ‘religious exiters’ (Cragun and Hammer, 2011). 
These accounts tend to centre around the shortcomings of the exiter’s religious tradition. By 
critiquing religion, the nonreligious enact various forms of ‘rejection identity’ (Smith, 2011) 

































































in relation to theism. For example, in Zuckerman’s study of people who left religion, 
interviewees explained their apostasy through their increasing disillusionment with religious 
beliefs, the loss of faith in God’s intrinsic goodness, or the incompatibility of sexual desire 
and orientation with their religion’s doctrine (2015). Some were prompted to leave their faith 
because of what Zuckerman terms ‘the malfeasance of others’ (2015: 90). These individuals 
rejected religion partly as a result of witnessing hypocrisy, immorality, or malice in the ranks 
of their community. Similarly, Fazzino’s study of former Evangelical Christians highlights 
the importance of understanding how the non-religious articulate their opposition to religion 
and mobilise it as a resource in life after religion (2014). Fazzino’s participants cited the 
hypocritical behaviour of their fellow Christians as one of the key reasons for leaving the 
faith (2014: 257). Guenther (2014) shifts the focus from how religious people perceive 
atheists to concentrate instead on how atheists view religious believers. Her participants saw 
religious people either as ‘innocent victims of predatory religious leaders’, or ‘narrow-
minded, tyrannical, and even evil’ (2014: 5). The harshest judgment was reserved for the 
leaders (‘evil’), while the followers were described as ‘dupes’ (Guenther 2014: 6). The term 
‘hypocrisy’ appears as a trope in several accounts where atheists criticize religious people for 
nonreligious behaviour. As Guenther points out, in some atheist narratives ‘hypocrisy 
contributes to the boundary between atheists and believers and is one important difference 
between them’ (2014:10). 
Another way in which nonreligious people dissociate from religion is through demoralising it 
so as to moralise their own nonreligious selves (Sumerau and Cragun, 2016). Highlighting 
the apparent inconsistency in religious people’s stated beliefs and actions constituted an 
important part of such strategies. For example, some of Sumerau and Cragun’s interviewees 
noted the conditional nature of religious people’s love for their fellow humans, while others 

































































recalled judgmental attitudes and a lack of empathy they encountered in their dealings with 
religious acquaintances (2016: 400-402).  
The examples presented above offer a useful illustration of the religious congruence fallacy 
and the next section of this paper sets the scene for the phenomenon in the Polish context. 
Religion and nonreligion in Poland 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century Poland remains the most Catholic country in 
Europe (Starr, 2018). In 2018, 92% of those surveyed declared themselves as believers and 
50% claimed to practice regula ly (CBOS, 2018). Most Polish people, including many 
nonbelievers, continue to rely on the Catholic Church to administer the key rites of passage, 
such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals (Baniak, 2008; Borowik, 2017). However, Poland’s 
status as the stronghold of Catholicism is increasingly being questioned. In April 2017, the 
weekly newsmagazine Polityka ran a provocatively-titled feature ‘Is Poland still a Catholic 
country?’ (Radzikowska, 2017). The article suggests that despite the declarations of faith by 
over 90% of the population, there is little evidence that Polish people are familiar with, or 
subscribe to, the basic tenets of Catholicism. Between 2005 and 2013 the percentage of 
practising Catholics decreased from 58 to 50% (CBOS, 2015: 3). Moreover, Polish religiosity 
is becoming more individualised, selective, and subjectivised (Marianski, 2017: 210). Polish 
people no longer consider weekly church attendance to be obligatory, nor do they think that 
the key principles of Catholicism need to be accepted in their totality (CBOS, 2013). The 
Church’s own estimates indicate a 2 million drop in the numbers of practising Catholics 
between 2003 and 2015 (ISSK, 2015). In 2018, the percentage of dominicantes (baptised 
participants in Sunday mass) was 38.2%, and communicantes (those receiving Holy 
Communion) accounted for 17.3% of all Catholics (Sadlon and Organek, 2019). The 

































































relaxation of attitudes to the sacred is also evident in several survey findings. A 2015 poll 
found that Poles reported being generally comfortable with shopping (66%) and working on 
Sunday (59%). Only 19% would be offended by the consumption of meat on Fridays (CBOS, 
2015). Moreover, the nation’s views on sexual morality depart from the official teachings of 
the Church. In 2014, 74% saw sex before marriage as morally acceptable, and an even higher 
percentage, 77%, approved of contraception (CBOS, 2014: 12).
Possibly the most significant predictor of future trends is the decrease in religiosity among 
young people. In 2015, 15% of 18-24 year-olds declared non-belief, and 44% attended mass, 
as opposed to 51% in 2005 (CBOS, 2015: 8). Similarly, the Pew Research Center’s report 
from 2018 showed that the gap in religiosity between the young and the elderly in Poland 
was one of the two largest in the world, with only 16% of under 40s claiming religion was 
very important, as opposed to 40% of the older cohort (Kramer and Fahmy, 2018: 2). 
Despite the shifts, the number of nones - Poles who do not identify with any religion - 
remains relatively low: between 3% and 8% (CBOS, 2013: 3; 2018: 1). In keeping with 
trends identified in other populations, the biggest growth in nones has occurred among the 
18-24 age cohort, urban dwellers, those with higher education, and those whose economic 
status is higher than that of their religious and very religious counterparts. 63% of Polish 
nones are men, and 37% are women.  Of all the nonreligious only 36% categorically deny the 
existence of God, 24% believe in a higher power of some kind, and 6% say they mostly 
believe in God (CBOS, 2013: 18).  Only 25% of all nones could be described as atheists, if 
by atheists we mean those who categorically deny the existence of god and possibility of an 
afterlife. Nones’ values resemble those of most Poles. Family and health were the most 
important aspects of life for the majority of those surveyed (73% and 64% respectively). 

































































Despite having a lot in common with their Catholic counterparts, nones in Poland inevitably 
function as a numerical and cultural minority. Their cultural minority status is rooted in the 
fact that their worldview, and resulting life choices and behaviour, tend to be at odds with the 
Catholic mainstream (Tyrala, 2018). Consequently, the Polish nones might engage in 
impression management to avoid stigmatisation and ostracism. While the minority status is 
not the central focus in this article, it is evident to different degrees in the data presented 
below.  
The Polak-Katolik3
The now axiomatic nexus between religion and national identity in Poland began to take form 
only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Piwowarski, 1982; Zubrzycki, 2006: 219; 
Porter-Szucs, 2011: 8). Until the second half of the nineteenth century Poland had been 
characterised by religious and cultural pluralism. It took until the inter-war period (1918-
1939), when Poland became independent, for the fusion between Roman Catholicism and 
Polishness to be fully articulated by nationalist ideologues. The model of ‘Polak-Katolik’ was 
at the heart of the process of ‘the nationalization of ethnic Poles’ whereby Catholicism was 
explicitly tied to national identity in the political and the religious spheres of life (Zubrzycki, 
2006: 55). It is then that the phrase entered public discourse as if to reflect the eternal truth 
about Poland. However, the myth is based on a tautology: ‘a Pole must be a Catholic because 
without Catholicism a person can no longer be a Pole’ (Porter-Szucs, 2011: 7). The equation 
of national identity with Catholicism had consequences for identifying the enemy within, as 
well as without, Poland. In the inter-war period, Jews were labelled as the cultural ‘other’ in 
relation to the rightful owners of the state: Polish Catholics. 

































































The narrative of the Polak-Katolik did not go unchallenged by secular fractions and there was 
no agreed upon definition of the model in the twentieth century. The consequences of 
promoting the ideal extended beyond mere symbolism. After WWII Poland became almost 
fully ethnically homogenous, and the politics of polonisation impacted on the status of the 
existing minorities (Mironowicz, 2000) which inevitably occupied the lower rungs of the 
ladder of ‘hierarchical pluralism’ (Pasieka, 2015: 35). The ethno-religious narrative of 
Catholic Poland was no longer contested (Zubrzycki, 2006: 62; Porter, 2011). The image of 
the Polish Catholic was further strengthened during the years of Communism (1945-1989). 
Poland was subsumed under an ostensibly atheist Soviet regime which promoted scientific 
atheism complete with rituals and ceremonies. Catholicism was continuously mobilized to 
oppose the atheist Soviet state and the Catholic Church became an autonomous guarantor of 
Polish identity confronting an alien power. As the only source of national identity, religion 
was further welded to Polishness. Post-1989 transformation saw religious values brought to 
the forefront in discussions over the shape of the public sphere, and the equation of Pole and 
Catholic was part of this process (Borowik, 2017: 316). At the same time, othering discourses 
have functioned to draw a clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Porter-Szucs, 2011: 34). 
The historical complexity and relative youthfulness of the stereotype of Polak-Katolik  
continue to shape the prevailing discourses of ‘real Polishness’ in the 21st century. In 2016, 
64% of Poles claimed being Catholic is important to being truly Polish (Pew Research 
Center, 2017). Making sense of the model through the eyes of those who do not fit it provides 
a key to the understanding of the place the nonreligious occupy in their homeland. The Polak-
Katolik’s historical function has been to draw a symbolic line between the right and the 
wrong ways of being Polish; yet a careful analysis of the origins of the stereotype reveals its 
relative fragility as the supposed primordial essence of Polishness. As Porter-Szucs puts it, 

































































‘the equation of Pole with Catholic […] is supported by a deeply ingrained but highly 
selective telling of national history’ (2011: 3). 
A successful upholding of this version of national history requires silencing the competing 
narratives in public discourse. Nonreligion embodies this narrative of Polishness because it 
does not neatly fit into the ethno-religious model of the Polish Catholic. This is what places 
the story of nones in the larger context of the country’s religious diversity. Non-Catholic 
religions present in Poland historically are not construed as Polish because ‘religious 
diversity can exist in the nation, but it cannot be of the nation’ (Porter, 2011: 4). Simply put, 
being nonreligious in Poland, just like being a Protestant or a Jew, could be seen by some as 
tantamount to betraying one’s nation. 
Moreover, Polish Catholicism is practically synonymous with the national Church. The ruling 
political party, Law and Justice, emphasizes the key role of the Catholic Church in public 
life, and maintains a close relationship with a proportion of the Church hierarchy. 4  The 
relationship between politicians and the Church is mutually reinforcing: Catholic values are 
frequently mobilized to strengthen the political message, and the Church hierarchs endorse 
the party’s moral conservatism. The party’s leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has publicly stressed 
the Church’s in shaping the morality of all Polish citizens, and explicitly presented the act of 
defending the Church as one’s patriotic duty. In several public speeches he pronounced that 
‘there is no Poland without the Church. […] A hand raised against the Church is a hand 
raised against Poland’ (Wilgocki, 2015; Kondzinska, 2019). This bond between religion and 
the nation inevitably frames the interactions between the nonreligious and religious Poles.  
The Study

































































This article is based on data from in-depth interviews (N= 60) with self-identified nones in 
Poland. The study was concerned with lived nonreligion in an ostensibly religious cultural 
context. Research was carried out over 12 months (January-Dec) in 2018 in the four largest 
cities in northern, central and southern Poland.5 The project was advertised through both 
formal and informal networks. First, the existing contacts in the four cities placed adverts on 
social media and on bulletin boards in local cafes, pubs, and university buildings. Second, 
snowball sampling with multiple starting points was employed to minimize the problem of 
homophily (Patton, 1990). The sole criterion for inclusion in the sample was that potential 
participants identified as ‘nonreligious’. 
As I was chiefly interested in ordinary ‘everyday’ nonreligion, political activists and public 
figures were excluded from the sample. None of my participants in the final sample 
considered themselves activists, which makes them an example of a ‘concealed population’ 
(Morgan, 2008) due to their relative lack of engagement in political movements related to 
nonreligion. Setting the limits of the concept is a frequent challenge for those researching 
nonreligion; defining the nones is riddled with complications (Lee, 2015; Smith and Cragun, 
2019). The fuzziness of the term was reflected in the characteristics of the sample. All of the 
participants in this study unreservedly subscribed to the general label ‘nonreligious’ but their 
interpretations of the term varied greatly. Of the 60, 53 had been raised ‘traditionally 
Catholic’, and 7 claimed their family households were nonreligious despite all the members 
having been baptized and some having completed the key rites of passage (First Communion, 
confirmation, and church weddings). Thus, all the interviewees possessed an ethno-Catholic 
habitus which shaped their interpretation of nonreligion. This implicit knowledge produces a 
unique understanding of the conceptual boundaries of nonreligion.

































































While for some participants nonreligion meant clear-cut atheism (defined as a lack of belief 
in the existence of any deities), for others it included ‘passive Catholicism’ which they also 
deemed typical of a large percentage of the Polish population. They defined ‘passive 
Catholics’ as those raised in Catholic families who continue to participate in Christmas and 
Easter, but who do not believe in God.6 Overall, of the 60 10 identified as atheists (5 of those 
considered themselves ‘militant’), 13 as ‘spiritual but not religious’, and the remainder used a 
variety of terms such as ‘nonreligious’, ‘nonbeliever’, ‘humanist’ and ‘passive Catholic’ 
interchangeably throughout the interview. Those 37 participants struggled to find one label to 
describe their position vis-à-vis religion. 
The youngest interviewee was 24 and the oldest 75. The sample was relatively balanced in 
terms of gender with 28 female and 32 male participants. However, it was strongly biased in 
favour of the highly educated: 58 out of 60 participants had a university degree, some had 
several, and five held doctorates in medicine, law, psychology, history, and linguistics 
respectively. They worked in a wide array of professions, including musicians, surgeons, 
massage therapists, counsellors, private business owners, translators, journalists, firefighters, 
shop assistants, and event organisers. Of the 60 interviewees, only 3 had carried out the act of 
formal defection from the Catholic Church, while 15 were considering commencing the 
process at the time of the research. 
Interviews took place in a variety of locations ranging from the participants’ homes, through 
workplaces, to public spaces. 50 were digitally recorded. Interviews lasted 90 minutes on 
average. They were conducted in Polish, transcribed, and translated into English prior to 
analysis.  The interview schedule comprised three broad themes: everyday interactions in 
public and private spaces; the relationship between national identity and religious affiliation; 

































































and moral values. This article draws on one of the key findings identified during the 
discussion of both everyday interactions, and religion and national identity. The theme could 
be loosely classed as the nones’ reflections on the concept of the Polak-Katolik. Crucially, 
the vast majority raised the topic spontaneously as we discussed religion in Poland. 
Nones and the Polak-Katolik
The term ‘Polak-Katolik’ appeared spontaneously throughout the interviews. My 
interlocutors focused mostly on questioning the existence of the model, so often cited as the 
defining feature of Polish society and a shorthand for any discussion of Polishness. Many 
used the phrase ‘some Catholic he is’ (‘taki tam z niego katolik’) when describing their 
compatriots’ approach to religiosity. The phrase sounds particularly dismissive in Polish as it 
implies that the person is not what they claim to be. Paradoxically, this disdain was not 
motivated by strong objection to religion per se, but by a profound dislike of hypocrisy and 
passivity which the nones observed among the general population. Despite being 
nonreligious themselves, they expected religious integrity from Catholic Poles who claimed 
the label in surveys, and in everyday conversation. The findings can be divided into three 
separate but inter-related themes: myth, hypocrisy, and the fear of being different. 
Myth 
The interviewees described Polak-Katolik as a cultural myth detached from lived reality. The 
participants’ accounts were emotionally-charged, as was the vocabulary they used. Jacek (60) 
dismissed the model as irrelevant to the majority of Poles:
The Polak-Katolik model is absurd. It’s a myth which describes maybe 25% of Poles 
who are hardcore Law and Justice voters. The rest are normal and don’t care. 

































































Jacek untethered religiosity from national identity as he interpreted the Polak-Katolik as a 
symbol of political preference rather than an all-around identity. He demarcated the boundary 
between the normal and the abnormal, suggesting that explicit identification with the Polak-
Katolik was unusual. Andrzej (42) further illustrated the nature of the myth: 
In the public sphere the Polak-Katolik is emphasised and useful for both the Church 
propaganda and the political propaganda. It’s a bit like forcing people into this pre-
formed shape. In reality, the Polak-Katolik could describe maybe half the nation who 
adhere to only some tenets of the faith. 
While Andrzej was more generous in his assessment of the percentage and the characteristics 
of Polish Catholics, he noted the entanglement of the Church and political interests in the 
promotion and imposition of the model on the nation. Andrzej suggested that even those who 
fit the model hardly meet the basic criteria because their Catholicism is selective. Pawel’s 
(34) reading differed. He believed that the Polak-Katolik was real because it had ‘real 
consequences’. The model ‘used to be a strong core around which to wrap Polishness when 
there was nothing else. It was useful for the Church but also for the people who wanted to 
preserve their national identity’. Bartek (29) was more concise yet: ‘[Polak-Katolik] is useful 
for people who perceive the nation as a religious thing. The rest of us have to put up with 
this’. Like Pawel, he appreciated the functionality of the ideal for those with a more religio-
national identification but, like Jacek, he distinguished between them and ‘the rest’ forced to 
tolerate it.  Similarly, Grazyna (57) claimed that the myth of Polak-Katolik had been ‘usurped 
by the Catholic Church and the politicians. It is the dominant narrative of national identity 
and patriotic discourse in Poland’.  Despite her disapproval of conspiracy theories, she 
thought the incorporation of Catholic symbols into the patriotic narrative was a deliberate 

































































strategy by those in power. The myth is invoked whenever something needs to be reaffirmed. 
Radek (44) echoed Grazyna’s view: 
Religion is used instrumentally because of this sentimental attitude which prevails in 
Polish society. ‘I am Polish, therefore I am Catholic’. This narrative implies that if you 
don’t believe, you’re not a Pole. I realise it’s a simplification but it does exist in the 
public discourse.
Grazyna, Radek, and others spoke at length about Law and Justice voters and the Church’s 
active involvement in politics. Two interviewees gave a more nuanced view of the Polak-
Katolik as internally plural and largely rooted in folk beliefs. Kuba (42) objected to the 
notion of ‘a zero-one religious identity’. Rather, ‘some people are Catholics but they disagree 
with the Church’s involvement in politics, others support everything the Church says. There 
are many shades of Catholicism’. According to Szymon (25) ‘there’s no such thing as 
monolithic Catholicism in Poland. The most popular type is the cultural, folk version where 
people think Virgin Mary is part of the Holy Trinity’. It is clear from the extracts above that, 
regardless of whether the Polak-Katolik accurately reflects the religious lives of Poles, the 
nones thought the concept served as a vessel for nationalistic propaganda by the government 
and the Church alike. This theme highlights the symbolic use of the model but how is the 
symbol enacted in practice by those it encompasses? My interviewees believed the 
inconsistency between theory and practice was the chief problem with the average Polak-
Katolik.  
Hypocrisy 
Hypocrisy is the act of pretending to be someone one is not. It is common for 
apostates to charge their former religious communities with hypocrisy – a phenomenon 
termed ‘the classic heretic’s excuse’ (Meadow and Kahoe 1984: 350). But it is equally 

































































common for the religious to accuse their co-religionists of not being truly religious as a 
means of elevating their own piety (Moberg 1987: 4). The Polish nones occupy a space 
between the heretic and the holier-than-thou: they share features of both but do not belong in 
either camp. They are not religious themselves, but they object to the hypocrisy of ordinary 
Polish Catholics. Despite the relative unimportance of Catholicism in their private lives, they 
comment on the religious integrity of their fellow Poles. For instance, for Karolina (38) the 
pairing of ‘Polak’ and ‘Katolik’ was ‘offensive to both the Catholics and the nonreligous in 
Poland because it’s a caricature’. She explained the dissonance between the theoretical model 
and everyday practices of a typical Polish Catholic as follows:
[The Polak-Katolik] likes Christmas because it’s a family tradition, not because it’s a 
church celebration. In small towns the Polak-Katolik goes to church to keep up 
appearances so the neighbours do not gossip. In big cities, nobody cares. 
Karolina identified several elements which add up to a fuller understanding of the dynamic 
between Polishness and Catholicism. Polish Catholics engage in rituals for social, not 
religious, reasons but the key driver is group pressure and the risk of ostracism. This risk is 
virtually non-existent in large urban centres where anonymity renders the pressure largely 
irrelevant. The Polak-Katolik fades away with the lessening of social monitoring. However, 
there is another way of enacting the myth. The average Polish Catholic is a nominal entity 
because they neither engage in a ‘holy masquerade’ (Moberg 1978) of performing pious 
religiosity, nor do they oppose it. Dominika (52) described her parents as nominal Polish 
Catholics who ‘will never say they’re nonbelievers but they don’t go to church, and they 
don’t like how the Church interferes in politics’. Indeed, the Church’s political involvement 
is highly unpopular. In 2015 84% disapproved of priests telling Catholics who to vote for and 
50% felt uneasy about the Church taking a stance on subjects discussed in parliamentary 
debates (CBOS, 2015: 3). 

































































Thus far, two practical definitions of the Polak-Katolik emerge from the interviews: 
one of Polish people who vote for the right-wing, Church-backed political party and hinge 
their national identity on Catholicism, and the other one of the average Polish individual, like 
Dominika’s parents, who could be described as nones, except they would never adopt the 
label themselves. Agata (30) outlined further complications which others also hinted at: ‘the 
trouble with it is that people do not have good role models’. She associated the demise of 
‘genuine Catholicism’ with the deaths of moral authorities such as Pope John Paul II (1920-
2005), and priest and philosopher Jozef Tischner (1931-2000). Similarly, Wojtek (29) 
emphasized the superficial nature of Polish Catholicism and the selective attitude of Polish 
people to the practice of their own religion: ‘the Polak-Katolik doesn’t really exist. Polish 
Catholics seem confused. Someone will go to church all the time but also live with a 
boyfriend without marriage, or eat meat on Fridays’. The inconsistency Wojtek highlighted 
may be vexing to some, but Polish Catholics rarely question the authenticity of another 
person’s beliefs. The theme of passivity and indifference towards faith recurred throughout 
the interview material. Aga (42) said: 
Polish people don’t particularly care if you believe or not. But in my family home we 
never hoovered on a Sunday, even though my dad is a staunch atheist! Because
“what would the neighbours say”? It’s a very Polish trait: keeping up appearances. 
That’s why the Polak-Katolik persists. 
Both Aga’s and Wojtek’s views are consistent with the survey evidence on Polish people’s 
attitudes to the sacred and profane presented earlier on. Evidently, the nones in this study 
found problematic what the general public claim they do not. 
Fear of Being Different

































































In religiously homogenous societies, it is difficult to distinguish between faith and 
social conformity. This is the case in Poland where Catholicism saturates culture to such an 
extent that the boundary between the secular and the sacred is blurred. Religion is carried on 
the wave of conformity and Polish culture is ‘“impregnated” with religion’ (Strassberg, 1988: 
353). The nones often cited ‘the universal fear of being different’ (Grzegorz, 47) as the 
reason for the persistence of the Polak-Katolik. This is where Poland resembles the findings 
in some U.S. studies where the fear of stigma is a common concern among the nonreligious 
generally, and atheists in particular (Edgell et al., 2006; Cragun et al., 2012; Gervais, 2013). 
For nonreligious Poles, the Polak-Katolik is the product of conformity to the cultural, but not 
necessarily religiously-based, norm. Many respondents offered creative metaphors to 
illustrate the lack of substance in the model. Maja (41) compared the Polak-Katolik to ‘a 
hollow eggshell, you know like the ones you paint at Easter. It looks like an egg but it’s not’. 
She added that this emptiness is reflected in the ‘automatic and unreflexive’ engagement in 
religious rituals. Misiek (44), defined the Polak-Katolik as someone ‘who does everything 
religious as a habit. Wedding is automatically in church. A child is born, we have a 
christening’. Most participants provided a variation on this theme. Przemek (39) explained: 
‘The Polak-Katolik goes to church because it’s how things should be. My atheist friends have 
been pressured into doing things because what will everyone say if you don’t?’ In his view, 
many people conform to avoid unnecessary trouble, even if they identify as atheists. Yet 
again, the Polak-Katolik model is presented in secular and cultural terms where the sensu 
stricto religious component is irrelevant. When we talked about Polish religiosity, Darek (47) 
laughed: 
What’s there to talk about? A high percentage of Polish Catholics are Catholics the way 
I was a Catholic for 25 years: because it was the done thing, because you wanted to fit 

































































in, because everyone expected you to do the religious things. I did it to stop my mother 
from nagging me. 
What the nones understood as hypocrisy could be subsumed under the general umbrella of 
cultural religion (Demerath 2000), continuously reinforced by the public presence of 
Catholicism, but also by the immediate social circles. Such socio-cultural Catholicism means 
that tradition legitimises beliefs and values, not the Church’s teachings per se. 
While the significance of family pressure featured strongly in all the interviews, 
Magda (53) provided a particularly vivid example. Her friend, a GP in a small town, baptised 
her baby: ‘only because granny insisted. Granny insisted because she worried about what 
people would say. She never goes to church but it’s a small community, so people would be 
asking questions’. Another interviewee, Paulina (35), neatly captured the normative essence 
of Polak-Katolik thus: ‘it’s a deeply rooted obsession with being like everyone else, not 
deviating from the norm. It’s conformism, it’s just convenient’. The pressure to participate in 
rituals emerges as the primary building block of the Polak-Katolik but the participation is 
mostly passive and unreflexive. Paradoxically, as Radek (48) put it, ‘the Polak-Katolik finds 
it easier to participate than to reflect. As a nation, we are fake Catholics’. This ‘fake’ 
Catholicism manifests itself most vividly when participation in the key rites of passage comes 
under public scrutiny. Martyna’s (30) husband’s family were vociferous critics of the Church 
who never attended mass or prayed but: 
When we did not baptise the baby, they gave me a sermon about the importance   of 
Catholic baptism! Suddenly they had a problem: ‘what if something happens to the 
baby?’ I guess they meant death. Baptism is like insurance for them. It’s keeping up 
appearances. 
When Dagmara (34) talked about her understanding of Polak-Katolik, she offered a story which 
she introduced as ‘a meme version of Polak-Katolik which sums up Polish religiosity’. Shortly 

































































after she had had a baby, a taxi driver asked her about baptism. Dagmara truthfully replied that 
she did not plan on baptising her baby. To her surprise, the taxi driver praised her for not 
‘wasting money on a party for other people’ but he also issued a warning: ‘these days those 
priests are so malicious and greedy that if you don’t baptise the baby, they won’t let her have 
her First Communion’! The anecdote paints a picture of the Polish Catholic other interviewees 
alluded to: someone suspicious of the Church and its representatives, yet also mindful of the 
social forces larger than one’s personal convictions. It also illustrates the fragility of the 
symbiotic relationship between the ‘nones’ and the cultural Catholicism. As Pasieka 
demonstrates in her study of minorities in rural Poland, non-Catholic minorities are accepted 
as long as their existence ‘does not infringe on the idea of the Polish -Catholic bond as natural 
and special’ (2015: 58). The example above fleshes out the paradoxes of the model of Polak-
Katolik, and the delicate balancing act performed by the nonreligious in daily interactions.
The Catholic ritual, with its norms and customs structuring both the life stages and the 
calendar year, has become so firmly inculcated into everyday life that it is practically 
impossible to separate the sacred from the secular in the Polish context. The leitmotif of 
unreflexive and passive participation in tradition recurred frequently in the interviews. Anna 
(39) felt that ‘a lot of Polish people more or less participate in the Catholic circus because 
they don’t want to be talked about as different’. This habitual religiosity comfortably coexists 
with anti-clericalism. Stefan (29) revealed: ‘I know anti-clerical people who go to church 
every Sunday. I don’t understand it’. In his view, Polish Catholics are ‘seasonal conformists’ 
who perform religiosity for social reasons (Laniel, 2017: 376). The normative power of the 
Polak-Katolik is most evident when the model becomes mobilised when the status quo is 
threatened by difference.  One such instance is a departure from tradition, such as church 
weddings and baptism described above. Another is difference understood more generally. As 
Krystyna (28) explained: 

































































Catholics in Poland are fine until someone is different, and then it starts. You know, 
the hatred and bile. So, whoever is different is the enemy: a homosexual, a Jew, and a 
non-Catholic. 
Krystyna collapsed several characteristics into what could also be understood as the Other.7 
Catholicism is not the defining normative ingredient here but it is tied up with ethnicity and 
sexuality. The ideal Polak-Katolik is a conforming heterosexual Christian. Karol (52) 
summed up the sentiment well: ‘Polish people do not like eccentricity. They don’t trust those 
who step outside the norm’. And yet the norm seems capacious and accommodates a range of 
behaviours. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Nonreligious people in this study based their critique of Polish Catholics on ‘the 
Catholic puzzle’ (Bane, 2005) – the perceived discrepancy between the teachings of the 
Catholic church and the practices of Catholics. They repeatedly returned to the term 
‘hypocrisy’ to indicate the inconsistency between professed religiosity and its actual 
expressions in day-to-day life. Their evaluation of the Polak-Katolik focused on the 
shortcomings of the putatively religious Poles. The participants expressed disappointment in 
the failure of Polish Catholicism to exercise the truly Christian mission in society. Their 
accounts of the typical Polak-Katolik were infused with frustration at the disjuncture between 
their compatriots’ beliefs and behaviour. The detailed interpretations go some way towards 
deconstructing the multi-dimensional nature of religiosity in Poland, but they also highlight 
the complexity of the ethno-religious myth. The nones emphasised what historians of Poland 
have noted repeatedly: that the myth of Polak-Katolik is propped up by revisionist 
constructions of the past (Demerath, 2000: 138; Porter-Szucs, 2011; Zubrzycki, 2006). The 
nonreligious stressed the fragility and unattainability of the ideal of the Polish Catholic. This 
does not mean that Catholicism in Poland is meaningless or false. Rather, Polish Catholicism 

































































is ‘not as strong as its supporters think, nor is it as weak as its critics describe’ (Marianski, 
2017: 228). Perhaps it is this ambiguity which my respondents identified and disapproved of. 
 Most importantly, the findings in this study testify to the ubiquity of the expectation 
of religious congruence. The Polish nones presented the inconsistencies between religious 
declarations and the practical enactment of these declarations as problematic at best and 
hypocritical and deceitful at worst. In this sense, their narratives exemplify the tendency 
whereby the general public, and the critics of religion specifically, hold erroneous 
assumptions about ‘the drive for congruence as the defining feature of religion’ (Chaves, 
2010: 9). The connection between religiosity and ‘what looks like logically related outcomes’ 
(Chaves, 2010: 5) is a fallacy because in reality religious congruence is rare. What the 
participants read as hypocrisy might be more accurately described as an instance of ‘religious 
incongruence’ (Chaves, 2010: 3). 
 When the nones stressed the passive religiosity of the Polak-Katolik, they 
demonstrated another important point made by Chaves, which is that religious rituals often 
‘disguise rather than reflect everyday realities’ (2010: 4). Attending church and participating 
in rituals helps to maintain appearances on the interpersonal level. This is also how the social 
order is reproduced. But the religious agency the nones expected to see in the truly religious 
Polish Catholics seems largely absent, except when triggered by specific scenarios. The 
nones’ diagnosis of the Polak-Katolik is sociologically accurate in that they correctly identify 
the common occurrence of religious incongruence. To develop this point further, we only 
need to examine the behaviour of young Polish people. While the young Catholics 
understand their faith less well, attend church and pray less frequently, they still see the 
Catholic Church as the main point of reference. To the nonreligious, this might look like 
religious incongruence, but ‘the religiosity of young Poles is full of paradoxes’ (Mandes and 

































































Rogaczewska, 2013: 268). Religious congruence is a rare occurrence, but the assumption of 
religious congruence is widespread, as evidenced by the model of the Polak-Katolik.
The present study also sheds light on the persistence of the ‘cultural power’ of 
Catholicism in Poland (Demerath, 2000) and the commonalities between the religious and the 
nonreligious. The Polak-Katolik is not simply ‘religiously connected without being 
religiously active’ (Demerath, 2000: 136). Rather they are more engaged and committed to 
the religion because of the power of social norms which are in turn enforced by the 
immediate social group and the larger symbolic framework. Religious symbols and rituals 
remain on standby ‘and may still be called upon to mobilize the faithful and the ‘“faithless” 
alike’ (Demerath, 2000: 137). The cultural power of the Polak-Katolik is exercised over all 
Poles. Even though the nonreligious notice and resist it explicitly, they have a lot in common 
with the average Polish Catholic. Both groups are tepid about Catholicism in the sense that 
they conform to the socially orchestrated demands of the faith without investing much of 
themselves in these displays of religiosity. Both are also critical of the Church. 
This shared attitude might be symptomatic of the ongoing transformations of Polish 
Catholicism. As some scholars have argued, its strictly religious functions have now been 
overshadowed by ‘the social functions of faith (i.e. the potential for socializing processes 
contained in […] rituals and beliefs)’ (Marody and Mandes, 2017: 250). 
 The findings in this study echo the existing research on the nones’ critique of religion 
which include the themes of hypocrisy and conformity (see e.g. Fazzino 2013; Guenther 
2014; Sumerau and Cragun 2016). In the same vein as the participants in Sumerau and 
Cragun’s (2016) study on nonreligious moral identities, Polish nones cited conformity as the 
defining feature of religion in their own cultural context. They were not indifferent towards 
Catholicism; to the contrary, they criticized Catholic Poles for their superficial adherence to 
faith. However, unlike Sumerau and Cragun’s participants, Polish nones did not depreciate 

































































religion generally, or Catholicism specifically. Rather, they saw the model of the Polak-
Katolik as disingenuous and inconsistent, which in their eyes made it inferior to both other 
religious identities and nonreligious stances. In doing so, they implicitly distinguished 
between ‘proper’ and ‘fake’ Catholicism in terms of both morality and rituals. 
 Previous research has addressed the perceptions of the nonreligious by the religious 
(Cragun et al. 2012; Edgell et al. 2006; Gerteis and Hartman, 2006; Gervais 2013; Hammer et 
al. 2012; Harper 2007) but we need to find out more about the other side of the story. In order 
to do so, it is necessary to go beyond the basic ‘heretic’s excuse’ and flesh out the 
complexities of the relationship between the nones and the religiously homogenous cultures 
within which they exist. 
 
Notes
1 In this article I use the term ‘nones’ and the ‘nonreligious’ interchangeably to capture the 
broad and relational category of ‘religion’s other’ (Smith and Cragun, 2019) which in this 
study includes self-identified non-practising nonbelievers, atheists, ‘passive Catholics’, 
humanists, and the ‘spiritual but not religious’.  
2 Of note here is Janusz Mucha’s 1989 seminal article on the status of nonbelievers in Poland. 
While not an empirical study, Mucha’s work usefully outlines the key features of unbelievers 
as a group, many of which remain relevant over thirty years on. The issues of visibility, social 
control, city-countryside divide, parenting dilemmas, and rites of passage continue to pose 
difficulty for nones. 
3 The discussion of the ‘Polak-Katolik’ here is by no means exhaustive. For rich and nuanced 
explorations of the model’s history, see Luczewski (2012) and Nowicka (1991). 

































































4 Law and Justice (PiS) is a right-wing populist political party which has been in power since 
2015. Catholicism and the Catholic Church occupy a central place in the party’s view of 
Polish society. Catholic teachings, patriotism, and tradition are considered the core 
ingredients in the creation of the political identity of the nation (PiS 2014). 
5 No cities from Eastern Poland were included in the sample because the calls for participants 
in that region rendered very few initial responses which eventually turned out to be dead 
ends. 
6 This theme is addressed in more detail in Author (forthcoming). 
7 For a detailed exploration of constructing enemies against the backdrop of the Polak-
Katolik, see Krzeminski (2017) and Zielinska (2018). 
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